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Abstract
This paper makes two contributions towards enabling a robot to provide explanatory descriptions of its decisions, the 
underlying knowledge and beliefs, and the experiences that informed these beliefs. First, we present a theory of explana-
tions comprising (i) claims about representing, reasoning with, and learning domain knowledge to support the construction 
of explanations; (ii) three fundamental axes to characterize explanations; and (iii) a methodology for constructing these 
explanations. Second, we describe an architecture for robots that implements this theory and supports scalability to complex 
domains and explanations. We demonstrate the architecture’s capabilities in the context of a simulated robot (a) moving 
target objects to desired locations or people; or (b) following recipes to bake biscuits.
Keywords Human–robot collaboration · Explanations · Non-monotonic logical reasoning · Probabilistic planning
1  Motivation
Robots can collaborate more effectively with humans if they 
can describe their decisions, the underlying beliefs, and the 
experiences that informed these beliefs. Enabling a robot 
to provide such explanatory descriptions is a challenging 
problem. The robot often makes decisions based on dif-
ferent descriptions of uncertainty and incomplete domain 
knowledge. For instance, a robot in a university building 
may know that “books are usually in the library”, and may 
process sensor inputs to infer that “the robotics book is in 
Prof. X’s office with 90% certainty”. While reasoning with 
this knowledge to compute a plan for any given goal, e.g., 
“move the robotics book to the meeting room”, the robot 
evaluates the available options using different performance 
measures, e.g., “corridor-1 is a shorter path to the library 
than corridor-2, but it is more crowded”. While reasoning 
or executing actions in the domain, the robot acquires new 
information that may complement or contradict existing 
beliefs. Also, human participants (if any) may not have the 
time or expertise to provide comprehensive information or 
extensive supervision. Furthermore, when an explanation is 
solicited by a human, it must be provided in an appropriate 
format and level of abstraction for it to be useful.
With the increasing use of AI and machine learning algo-
rithms in different applications, there is renewed interest in 
understanding the decisions of these algorithms as a means 
to improve the algorithms and promote accountability. There 
is considerable work on making the decisions of an existing 
learned model or reasoning system more interpretable, and 
on modifying an existing learning or reasoning system to 
make decisions that are easier for humans to understand. 
Many such approaches tend to be computationally expen-
sive, or are perceived as lacking information or containing 
too many unnecessary details [18]. In this paper, we instead 
seek to formalize a holistic view of the process of describing 
decisions, beliefs, and experiences during reasoning, learn-
ing, and execution in human-robot collaboration. In our for-
malism, the desired transparency in decision making is fully 
integrated with, and strongly influenced by, the underlying 
knowledge representation, reasoning, and learning methods. 
We make the following contributions:
1. Present a theory of explanations comprising claims 
about representing, reasoning with, and learning 
knowledge to support explanations; axes characteriz-
ing explanations based on abstraction of representation, 
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explanation specificity, and explanation verbosity; and a 
methodology for constructing explanatory descriptions.
2. Describe an architecture for robots that implements our 
theory, exploits the underlying representation and rea-
soning mechanisms to identify and compute the infor-
mation relevant to the human query, and reliably and 
efficiently constructs suitable explanatory descriptions 
that answer the query.
We illustrate the architecture’s capabilities in the context of a 
simulated robot assisting humans by (i) delivering objects to 
different locations or people in an office building; or (ii) fol-
lowing recipes to bake biscuits in a kitchen. We first review 
related work (Sect. 2). We then describe our theory of expla-
nation (Sect. 3) and our architecture that implements this 
theory (Sect. 4). Sect. 5 explores the impact of our theory, in 
conjunction with the representation and reasoning methods, 
on scalable construction of explanatory descriptions, fol-
lowed by a discussion of future work in Sect. 6.
2  Related Work
Research in cognition, psychology, and linguistics influ-
enced some of the early work on representing and reason-
ing about explanations. Friedman [12] presented a theory 
of scientific explanation in terms of generality, objectivity, 
and connectivity, and Grice [16] characterized cooperative 
response as being valid, informative, relevant, and unam-
biguous. Fundamental computational models have also been 
developed for explanation generation [19, 22, 25].
With AI and machine learning algorithms being used in 
different applications, there is renewed interest in under-
standing their outcomes as a means to improve reliability and 
establish accountability. Workshops and sessions have been 
organized at premier conferences on topics such as Explain-
able AI and Explainable Planning in the last few years. Work 
in this area can be broadly categorized into two groups [24]. 
Methods in the first group modify or map learned models 
or reasoning systems to make their decisions interpretable, 
e.g., explaining the predictions of any classifier by using its 
decisions to learn an interpretable model [20, 26], or adding 
bias in a planning system towards making decisions easier 
for humans to understand [38]. Methods in the second group 
present descriptive explanations of the decisions made by 
reasoning systems, e.g., methods that explain changes in an 
agent’s goals [9] or plans [27], or allow humans to poll the 
system about alternative plans [6, 31]. Much of this research 
has been agnostic to how an explanation is structured and 
presented [6, 8, 31, 37], assumed complete domain knowl-
edge [8], or has had limited instantiation in working systems 
[27, 36]. Our work is more similar to those in the second 
group and addresses their limitations.
Human studies have been used to identify principles 
governing explanations [7] and present a theory requiring 
explanations to be understandable, context-specific, and jus-
tifiable [15]. Human studies have also been used to empha-
size the importance of presenting information in the right 
way [11]. Prior work on agents describing decisions in a 
simulated tactical combat domain indicates that an agent 
should describe its activities, goals, rationale, and experi-
ences; and answer explanatory questions in suitable formats 
based on a model of user beliefs [17].
There is limited work on the kind of recounting (of deci-
sions, underlying beliefs, and experiences that informed 
these beliefs) that is the focus of our work, but explanations 
have been grouped into those of outcomes at the system level 
(“reasoning trace explanations”), strategies at the problem-
solving level (“strategic explanations”), and of reasons for 
particular states and actions (“deep explanations”) [30]. 
Sheh [29] distinguishes between three explanation “depths”, 
where model attributes and their use, or information about 
model generation, are considered for generating explanations 
categorized as teaching, introspective tracing, introspective 
informative, post-hoc, and execution.
Very few approaches systematically identify dimensions 
suitable for characterizing explanations in human-robot 
collaboration. In one approach, a robot uses three axes 
(abstraction, specificity, locality) to verbalize its navigation 
experience to humans [28]. This work uses methods hard-
coded for traversing a building; it does not generalize to 
other domains. For instance, locality determines the subset 
of the route to be used to construct the explanation, and 
specificity considers different parts of the route at different 
levels. The authors derive these axes from research on user 
preferences [4, 10, 35], but these studies are too dissimilar to 
an agent narrating its experiences. A recent survey of work 
on explainable agents and robots indicates the need for a 
general theory of explanations for human-robot collabora-
tion that is integrated with the underlying representation, 
reasoning and learning abilities [1].
Our prior work outlined the capabilities and systems an 
agent needs to explain its decisions [21]. In this paper, we 
provide a holistic formalization of the process of providing 
explanatory descriptions of decisions, beliefs, and experi-
ences. We present a theory of explanations for human-robot 
collaboration that is fully integrated with, and strongly 
influenced by, the knowledge representation, reasoning, and 
learning capabilities. We also describe an implementation of 
this theory in an architecture that supports scalable reason-
ing. An initial version of this work appeared as a symposium 
paper [33].
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3  Theory of Explanation
This section describes our theory of explanation comprising 
the guiding principles or claims (Sect. 3.1), the axes charac-
terizing explanations (Sect. 3.2), and the methodology for 
generating explanations (Sect. 3.3).
3.1  Guiding Principles
Based on insights gained from prior work, we have identi-
fied the following guiding principles or claims to support 
explanations in human-robot collaboration:
1. Explanations should present context-specific informa-
tion relevant to the domain, task or question under con-
sideration, at an appropriate level of abstraction.
2. Explanations should be able to provide online descrip-
tions of decisions, rationale for decisions, knowledge, 
beliefs, experiences that informed the beliefs, and under-
lying strategies or models.
3. Explanation generation systems should have as few task-
specific or domain-specific components as possible.
4. Explanation generation systems should consider human 
understanding and feedback to inform their choices 
while constructing explanations.
5. Explanation generation systems should use knowledge 
elements that support non-monotonic revision based on 
immediate or delayed observations obtained from active 
exploration or reactive action execution.
The implementation of these principles in an architecture 
influences and is influenced by how knowledge is repre-
sented, reasoned with, and learned in the architecture. We 
choose to expand our prior architecture (Sect. 4) because 
it provides capabilities that facilitate this implementation.
3.2  Characteristic Axes
Based on these claims, we propose the use of the following 
three fundamental axes to characterize explanations:
1. (Representation abstraction) This axis models the lev-
els of abstraction at which knowledge is represented for 
reasoning and explanation. For instance, the robot may 
use a coarse-resolution domain description in terms of 
rooms and the objects (e.g., cups, books) in these rooms, 
or it may use a fine-resolution description in terms of 
grid cells in the rooms and object parts (e.g., cup handle, 
cup base) in these grid cells.
2. (Communication specificity) This axis models what the 
robot focuses on while communicating with the human. 
For instance, to explain the decision to traverse a longer 
corridor instead of a shorter one, the robot may provide: 
(i) an explanation that considers the corridors’ crowd-
edness; or (ii) an explanation that considers the crowd-
edness of the corridors, the robot’s energy levels and 
ability to move safely, and the objective of maximizing 
task completion and safety.
3. (Communication verbosity) This axis models the com-
prehensiveness of the response provided. For instance, 
when asked to explain the plan computed to achieve a 
particular goal, the robot may describe: (i) just the last 
action in its plan and how it achieves the goal; (ii) all 
the the actions in the plan that results in the goal being 
achieved; or (iii) all the actions in the plan, along with 
the preconditions and effects of each of them, to show 
how the goal is achieved.
Each explanation maps to a point along each of these axes, 
i.e., it maps to the three-dimensional space defined by these 
axes. Varying the point along these axes changes the infor-
mation included in (and communicated by) the explanation, 
and the format in which this information is communicated.
3.3  Methodology for Generating Explanations
Given an implementation of the claims and the characteris-
tic axes, we propose the following methodology to provide 
explanations in response to any particular query:
1. In response to a specific question/request, parse human 
input to determine what is being asked.
2. Choose a suitable position along each of the three axes 
to inform how the explanation will be structured.
3. Determine what needs to be described in the explana-
tion. This may take the form of choices made, justifica-
tion for these choices, knowledge elements, beliefs, and 
experiences that informed these beliefs.
4. Reason with domain knowledge to compute required 
information (if needed) and to identify relevant knowl-
edge elements. Use the decisions about the structure of 
the explanation to transform these knowledge elements 
into context-specific explanatory elements.
5. Construct explanations from the explanatory elements, 
limiting the use of domain-specific knowledge. Con-
struct verbalizations of these explanations to answer 
user queries.
6. Use human feedback to revise the choice made in Step 
2 about a suitable point along the three axes.
Following this methodology will enable the robot to pro-
vide explanations that are relevant to the task and user under 
consideration. In Sect. 4.6, we will expand on this general 
methodology to provide a specific sequence of steps to be 
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followed to generate the desired explanations. The next sec-
tion describes an implementation of our theory in a cognitive 
architecture. We will primarily use the following example 
domain to illustrate the capabilities of the architecture.
Example Domain 1 [Robot Assistant (RA)] Consider a robot 
that has to find and deliver objects to people or places (study, 
office, workshop, kitchen) in an indoor domain. Each place 
may have instances of objects such as book and cup. Each 
human has a role (e.g., engineer, manager, sales). Objects 
are characterized by the attributes size and color. Some other 
details of the domain include:
• The position of the robot and objects can change due to 
the execution of one or more actions of the robot.
• The robot can move to a place, pick up or put an object 
at a particular place, or deliver an object to a person.
• The domain may be viewed at different resolutions, e.g., 
a place can be one or four rooms or one of four cells 
within each room, and the robot may move an object or 
a part of the object to a particular room or grid cell.
Reasoning occurs over finite time steps with partial knowl-
edge of domain objects and the rules governing the domain 
dynamics, e.g., the robot knows that objects can only be 
delivered to people in the same place as the robot; we pro-
vide some examples of axioms later in this paper.
We will use a variant of this domain ( RA∗ ) to explore the 
impact of quantization on explanations, e.g., a room with 
100 cells instead of four. We also use the following domain 
based on the scenario in [5].
Example Domain 2 [Robot Baker (RB)] A robot baker in a 
kitchen has two work tables, one for preparation and another 
with a toaster oven. For an item to be baked, all ingredients 
(cocoa, sugar, flour, cornflakes, and butter) are pre-meas-
ured and placed in bowls on the table. Kitchen tools are 
characterized by type (bowl, tray, oven), material (plastic, 
metal), size (small, medium, large) and color (red, yellow, 
silver), e.g, five plastic ingredient bowls of various sizes and 
colors, a large mixing bowl, a metal oven tray, and a toaster 
oven. Other details of this domain include:
• The robot has grasping and stirring manipulators.
• The domain may be viewed at different resolutions, e.g., 
the tools may be on the work table or in one of the six 
cells considered on the work table.
This domain’s encoding involves deeper sort hierarchies than 
the RA domain, e.g., an object may be a mixing bowl , which 
is a bowl, which is a container, which is an object, which is 
a thing. Also, plans in the domain, which represent recipes 
being followed, can be more varied, with many more coarse 
and fine-resolution actions, e.g., to bake “Afghan biscuits”, 
the robot has to pour, mix, scrape, preheat, re-position, bake, 
etc, each of which can be represented by up to ten fine-res-
olution actions.
4  Reasoning Architecture
Figure 1 shows our overall architecture. It is based on the 
principle of step-wise refinement and reasons with tightly-
coupled transition diagrams at different resolutions. Depend-
ing on the domain and tasks, the robot computes and exe-
cutes plans at two resolutions, but constructs explanations at 
other resolutions as needed. For ease of understanding, we 
focus on two resolutions in the description below, with the 
fine-resolution transition diagram defined as a refinement of 
the coarse-resolution diagram; we briefly discuss extensions 
to other resolutions later. For any given goal, non-monotonic 
logical reasoning with commonsense domain knowledge in 
the coarse resolution provides a plan of abstract actions. 
Each abstract transition is implemented as a sequence of 
concrete actions by automatically zooming to and reasoning 
with the relevant part of the fine-resolution diagram. Each 
concrete action is executed using probabilistic models of 
the uncertainty in sensing and actuation, with the relevant 
outcomes added to the histories at the appropriate resolu-
tions. Reasoning also guides the interactive learning of pre-
viously unknown actions, action capabilities, and axioms 
representing domain dynamics. The architecture combines 
the complementary strengths of declarative programming, 
probabilistic reasoning, and relational learning, and is 
viewed as a logician and statistician working together. Sub-
sets of components, except the theory of explanation and its 
Fig. 1  Architecture represents and reasons with tightly coupled tran-
sition diagrams at different resolutions. It combines the complemen-
tary strengths of declarative programming and probabilistic reasoning
KI - Künstliche Intelligenz 
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implementation, are described in other papers [14, 32, 34]. 
We summarize the components here for completeness.
4.1  Action Language
Action languages are formal models of parts of natural lan-
guage used for describing transition diagrams of dynamic 
systems. Our architecture uses action language ALd [13] to 
describe the different transition diagrams. ALd has a sorted 
signature with statics (fluents), i.e., domain attributes whose 
truth values cannot (can) be changed by actions, and actions, 
a set of elementary operations. Fluents can be basic, which 
obey inertia laws and can be changed by actions, or defined, 
which do not obey the laws of inertia and are not changed 
directly by actions. A domain attribute or its negation is a 
literal. ALd allows three types of statements: causal law, 
state constraint, and executability condition.
4.2  Knowledge Representation
The coarse-resolution domain description comprises a 
system description Dc of transition diagram 휏c , which is a 
collection of statements of ALd , and history Hc . Dc com-
prises a sorted signature 훴c and axioms governing domain 
dynamics. For the RA domain, 훴c defines basic sorts such 
as place, thing, robot, person, object, and cup, arranged 
hierarchically, e.g., object and robot are subsorts of thing, 
the sort step for temporal reasoning, and instances of sorts, 
e.g., rob1 and cup1 . For the RA domain, 훴c includes statics 
such as next_to(place, place) and obj_color(object, color) , 
fluents loc(thing, place) and in_hand(robot, object) , and 
actions move(robot, place), give(robot, object, person), and 
pickup(robot, object); exogenous actions can be included to 
explain unexpected observations. 훴c also includes the rela-
tion holds(fluent, step) to imply that a fluent is true at a time 
step. Dc for the RA domain includes axioms such as:
that are used for reasoning. Finally, the history Hc of a 
dynamic domain is typically a record of fluents observed 
to be true or false at a time step, and the occurrence of an 
action at a time step. Prior work expanded this notion to rep-
resent defaults describing the values of fluents in the initial 
state. For instance, Hc of the RA domain encodes “books 
are usually in the library and if it not there, they are nor-
mally in the office”, with the exception “cookbooks are in 
the kitchen”. For more details, please see [34].
move(rob1,P) 퐜퐚퐮퐬퐞퐬 loc(rob1,P)
loc(O,P) 퐢퐟 loc(rob1,P), in_hand(rob1,O)
퐢퐦퐩퐨퐬퐬퐢퐛퐥퐞 give(rob1,O,P) 퐢퐟 loc(rob1, L1), loc(P,L2)
4.3  Reasoning with Knowledge
Reasoning tasks of a robot associated with a domain descrip-
tion include inference, planning and diagnostics. To do so, the 
domain description is translated to a program in CR-Prolog, a 
variant of Answer Set Prolog (ASP) that incorporates consist-
ency restoring (CR) rules [3]. We use the terms CR-Prolog 
and ASP interchangeably in this paper. ASP is based on stable 
model semantics, and supports default negation and epistemic 
disjunction, e.g., unlike “ ¬a ” that states a is believed to be 
false, “ not a ” only implies a is not believed to be true. A literal 
can thus be true, false or unknown. ASP represents recursive 
definitions and constructs difficult to express in classical logic 
formalisms, and supports non-monotonic logical reasoning. 
For coarse-resolution reasoning, program 훱(Dc,Hc) includes 
훴c and axioms of Dc , inertia axioms, reality checks, closed 
world assumptions for defined fluents and actions, and obser-
vations, actions, and defaults from Hc . Every default also has 
a CR rule to let the robot assume the default’s conclusion is 
false to restore consistency under exceptional circumstances. 
An answer set of 훱 represents the robot’s beliefs. Algorithms 
for computing entailment, and for planning and diagnostics, 
reduce these tasks to computing answer sets of CR-Prolog pro-
grams. We compute answer sets using the SPARC system [2].
4.4  Refinement, Zooming and Probabilistic 
Execution
Although reasoning with 훱(Dc,Hc) provides a plan of actions 
for any given goal, the robot may not be able to execute some 
actions or to observe the values of some fluents. For instance, 
a robot may not be able to directly observe if it is located in 
a given room, or to pick up an object just because it is in the 
same room. Actions that cannot be executed directly and 
fluents that cannot be observed directly are considered to be 
abstract. To implement an abstract transition, we construct a 
fine-resolution system description Df  of transition diagram 휏f  
that is a refinement of Dc . Refinement may be viewed as look-
ing through a magnifying lens, potentially discovering domain 
structures that were previously abstracted away (intentionally). 
We briefly describe the steps below; see [34] for details.
We first construct a weak refinement ignoring the ability 
to observe the values of fluents. Signature 훴f  includes (i) ele-
ments of 훴c ; (ii) new sort for every sort of 훴c magnified by 
the increase in resolution; (iii) counterparts for each magnified 
domain attribute (and actions with magnified sorts) from 훴c ; 
and (iv) domain-dependent static relations that relate magni-
fied objects and their counterparts. For the RA domain, new 
basic sorts in 훴f  include:
where {c1,… , cm} are cells in places, base and handle 
are components of cup, and “*” denotes fine-resolution 
place∗ = {c1,… , cm}, cup
∗ = {cup1_base, cup1_handle}
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counterparts. Domain attributes and actions of 훴f  include 
those of 훴c modified to reflect the basic sorts of 훴f :
Axioms of Df  are obtained by restricting the axioms of Dc 
to 훴f  , e.g., axioms of the RA domain include:
Next, to represent the ability to make observations, our 
theory of observation expands 훴f  to include knowledge 
producing actions that test the value of fluents and changes 
knowledge fluents describing observations of fluents. Axi-
oms are added to Df  to encode the test actions, using suitable 
domain-dependent defined fluents, e.g., to describe when 
the robot can test the value of fluents. For each transition 
between coarse resolution states 휎1 and 휎2 , we can show that 
there is a path in 휏f  between a refinement of 휎1 and a refine-
ment of 휎2—the proof is in [34].
Df  does not have to be revised unless the domain changes 
significantly, but reasoning with Df  becomes computa-
tionally unfeasible for complex domains. For any abstract 
transition T = ⟨휎1, aH , 휎2⟩ ∈ 휏H , the robot automatically 
zooms to and reasons with Df (T) , the part of Df  relevant 
to T. To obtain Df (T) , the robot determines the object con-
stants of 훴c relevant to T, restricts Dc to these object con-
stants to obtain Dc(T) , computes the basic sorts of 훴f (T) 
as those of 훴f  that are components of the basic sorts of 
Dc(T) , restricts domain attributes and actions of 훴f (T) 
to these basic sorts, and restricts axioms of Df  to 훴f (T) . 
For the transition T = ⟨휎1,move(rob1, kitchen), 휎2⟩ with 
loc(rob1, office) ∈ 휎1 in the RA domain, 훴f (T) includes 
basic sorts robot = {rob1} , place = {office, kitchen} and 
place∗ = {ci ∶ ci ∈ kitchen ∪ office} , domain attributes 
loc∗(rob1,C) taking values from place∗ and loc(rob1,P) 
taking values from place, and actions move∗(rob1, ci) and 
suitable test actions. Restricting the axioms of Df  to 훴f (T) 
removes axioms for pickup and putdown, and irrelevant con-
straints. For any coarse-resolution transition T, there is a 
path in Df (T) between a refinement of 휎1(T) and a refinement 
of 휎2(T)—see [34] for details.
Our prior work constructed a partially observable 
Markov decision process from Df (T) to implement T. Since 
this approach is computationally inefficient for complex 
domains, we now construct and solve 훱(Df (T),Hf ) to obtain 
a sequence of concrete actions, each of which is executed by 
loc(thing, place), loc∗(thing∗, place∗),
move(robot, place), move∗(robot, place∗)
in_hand(robot, object), in_hand∗(robot, cup∗)
move∗(R,C) 퐜퐚퐮퐬퐞퐬 loc∗(R,C)
pickup(R,O) 퐜퐚퐮퐬퐞퐬 in_hand(R,O)
pickup∗(R,Cp) 퐜퐚퐮퐬퐞퐬 in_hand∗(R,Cp)
loc(O,P) 퐢퐟 component(C,P), loc∗(O,C)
the robot using existing algorithms (e.g., for path planning 
and object recognition) that consider learned probabilistic 
models of the uncertainty in sensing and actuation. High-
probability outcomes of a concrete action are elevated to 
statements with certainty in Hf  , and the outcomes of reason-
ing with 훱(Df (T),Hf ) are added to Hc.
4.5  Interactive Learning
Reasoning with incomplete knowledge can produce incor-
rect or suboptimal outcomes. Learning previously unknown 
actions and axioms may require many labeled examples, 
which is difficult in robot domains. Also, humans may not 
have the time and expertise to provide labeled examples or 
supervision, and an action’s effects may be delayed.
Our architecture includes two schemes for interactively 
acquiring labeled examples and previously unknown domain 
knowledge. The first scheme enables active learning of 
actions and causal laws from human verbal descriptions of 
the observed behavior of other robots. This scheme assumes 
that (a) other robots in the domain (whose behavior can be 
observed) have the same capabilities as the learner robot; 
and (b) human description of the observed behavior focuses 
on one action at a time, and it may be ambiguous but not 
intentionally incorrect. When human input is available, the 
learner receives a transcribed verbal description of an action 
and extracts a relational representation of the observed 
action’s consequences. Standard natural language processing 
tools such as a part of speech tagger and the linked synsets 
of WordNet are used to process the transcribed description 
to extract sorts, attributes, and actions. The new elements are 
added to the signature and used with the processed obser-
vations to construct new causal laws, incrementally gen-
eralizing over time. For instance, processing “the robot is 
labeling a big textbook” and the observation labeled(book1) 
results in the new action label(robot, book) and the causal 
law label(robot, book) 퐜퐚퐮퐬퐞퐬 labeled(book).
The second scheme enables learning of action capabili-
ties and axioms governing domain dynamics, e.g., causal 
laws and executability conditions. It considers observations 
obtained either by actively exploring the potential effects 
of an action, or through (reactive) action execution when 
an action does not have the expected outcome. This scheme 
first picks a state transition to be explored further. The task 
of identifying state-action combinations likely to produce 
the transition of interest in the presence of immediate or 
delayed rewards, is posed as a reinforcement learning (RL) 
problem to mimic interaction with the domain. This basic 
RL formulation becomes computationally unfeasible for 
complex domains. To make learning more tractable, we use 
ASP-based reasoning to automatically restrict learning to 
object constants, domain attributes, and axioms relevant to 
the desired transition. To further limit the search space and 
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support generalization, a decision tree is learned based on 
the relational representation and the examples from RL tri-
als (i.e., states, actions, and rewards experienced). The tree 
provides a policy to direct exploration in the subsequent RL 
trials, and candidate axioms that are generalized over time. 
For more details, see [32].
4.6  Constructing Explanations
To construct an explanation in response to a query, the robot 
uses an instantiation of the general methodology described 
in Sect. 3.3. Existing software implementations of algo-
rithms enable the robot to determine parts of speech in text 
(or transcribed verbal input), and select appropriate words 
and translate their synonym sets into a controlled vocabu-
lary of domain terms (e.g., objects, actions, and relations). 
Existing software is also used to construct sentences from 
templates based on the controlled vocabulary, distinguish 
between physical entities and mental concepts, and to solicit 
feedback from humans. Although we do not discuss it in this 
paper, we also have software that can be used to visually 
identify domain objects, actions, and spatial relations when 
we use our architecture on physical robots. The specific steps 
to be followed are:
1. Parse input query to extract cues (i.e., words and phrases) 
that match known templates and controlled vocabulary. 
Given a particular query, e.g., “where is the huge soft-
ware manual?”, first extract the parts of speech, e.g., 
adjective:‘big’ and compound noun:‘software manual’, 
and then identify matching words in the vocabulary, e.g., 
‘huge’ = ‘large’ and ‘software manual’ = ‘book’. Also 
extract key words (e.g., “where”, “why”, “describe”, 
“detail”) that help determine the kind of explanation to 
be constructed (more details below).
2. Use cues from query to select a point along the represen-
tation abstraction axis, i.e., choose a suitable resolution. 
Reuse resolution selected for the previous interaction, or 
use a baseline resolution, unless user query indicates a 
preference. For instance, if the user input contains the 
phrase “Please provide a more detailed...”, it directs the 
robot to select a coarser resolution.
3. Choose points along the communication specificity and 
verbosity axes using cues extracted from the query. Once 
again, choose a baseline point or continue with a previ-
ous selection unless the query indicates a preference, 
e.g., the input phrase “Very briefly tell me...” directs the 
robot to the low end of the verbosity axis.
4. Reason with domain knowledge at the appropriate res-
olution, and with the identified cues (from query), to 
compute answer sets (if needed), and to identify rel-
evant literals representing knowledge elements (objects, 
actions, relations). For instance, “what did you do at step 
3?” requires the action executed at that time step to be 
extracted from the answer set, and “why did you move 
to the library at step 2?” requires the robot to compute 
the answer set before and after the action’s execution, 
identify changes in beliefs, and to relate these changes 
to the goal and query.
5. Use chosen points along the three axes, the controlled 
vocabulary, and the known subject-object-predicate 
templates, to transform the identified elements to text 
descriptions . For instance, pick_up(rob1, book2) , where 
book2 is a robotics book, provides the description “the 
robot picked up the robotics book”. This includes the 
selection of attributes to use as modifiers, e.g., “a room” 
or “a medium-sized, library room”, and the choice of 
the reference symbol, e.g., “a library”, “the library”, or 
study1 refer to the same place.
In the specific implementation whose evaluation we 
report below, we considered two tightly-coupled resolu-
tions (abstraction axis). Also, for each requested increase 
(decrease) in the level of detail, we increased (decreased) by 
a factor the number of related knowledge elements (speci-
ficity) and the level of detail (verbosity) used to construct 
explanations. These choices and the domain’s quantization 
influence the ambiguity of the explanatory descriptions. 
High verbosity and high specificity descriptions are unam-
biguous whereas low verbosity and low specificity descrip-
tions are confusing; also, if rooms have 10 × 10 cells instead 
of 2 × 2 , the length of the plan and explanation increases. 
Our software for reasoning and constructing explanations is 
available in our repository [23]. Note that the methodology 
and steps for generating explanations are general and can be 
adapted to other domains, resolutions etc.
5  Execution Examples and Results
Our focus in this paper is on exploring how the interplay 
between knowledge representation, reasoning, and learning 
supports interactive explanation generation. The coupling 
between the architecture’s components enables these capa-
bilities but makes it challenging to perform an extensive 
quantitative evaluation or comparison with other architec-
tures; this is a known problem with cognitive architectures. 
We have reported the scalability and reliability of knowledge 
representation, reasoning, and learning with the our base-
line refinement-based architecture in other papers [32, 34]. 
In this section, we thus first discuss execution traces that 
illustrate the impact of our guiding principles on the ability 
to construct explanations interactively (Sect. 5.1). We then 
measure the reliability and computational cost of generating 
explanations as a function of the complexity of the domain 
and the explanations (Sect. 5.2). We aim to use insights 
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obtained from these traces and experiments to conduct suit-
able usability studies with human subjects in the future.
5.1  Execution Traces
We use execution traces based on the three illustrative 
domains described in Sect. 3.3 to examine the failure cases 
that could exist in the absence of the corresponding guid-
ing principle in the theory. We hypothesize that the robot 
is able to provide explanations in response to user requests 
(or queries), and that the approach to provide explanations 
scales to complex domains and explanations. For ease of 
understanding, we omit some parts of the explanations and 
show them as “[...]” in the text.
퐏퐫퐢퐧퐜퐢퐩퐥퐞 #ퟏ ∶ Explanations should present context-spe-
cific information relevant to the domain, task or question 
under consideration, at an appropriate level of abstraction.
Execution Example 1 [Example 1: RA Domain] Consider 
a robot in the RA domain that has just moved a book to the 
study and delivered a book from the study to the engineer 
in the office.
• Human: “Please describe the plan you executed.”
  Robot: “ [...] I moved to the study. I put down a small 
programming book on table1 . I picked up a large robotics 
book from table1 . I moved to the office. I gave the large 
robotics book to the engineer. I achieved the goal.”
• When asked to provide a more detailed description, the 
robot revises the point along the abstraction axis; in the 
current implementation, this corresponds to using the 
fine-resolution description to generate an explanation.
  Human: “Provide a more detailed description.”
  Robot: “[...] I moved to cell c2 in the study. [...] I 
moved to cell c4 in the study and put down a small pro-
gramming book with a hard cover on the table. I picked 
up the large robotics book with a soft cover by its spine 
from the table. [...] I moved to cell c2 of the study. [...] 
I moved to cell c7 of the office. I gave the large robotics 
book to the engineer. I achieved the goal.”
The absence of this principle would permit explana-
tions lacking in domain information, e.g., the response may 
be “I moved somewhere. Then I used something to act on 
something”. The robot may also provide the information 
at an inappropriate level of abstraction, e.g., the robot may 
respond to “Briefly tell me what happened” with “I moved 
to cell c4 in the library. I moved to cell c3 in the library. I 
picked up book2 . [...] I moved to cell c6 in the study [...]”.
퐏퐫퐢퐧퐜퐢퐩퐥퐞 #ퟐ ∶ Explanations should be able to provide 
online descriptions of decisions, rationale for decisions, 
knowledge, beliefs, experiences that informed the beliefs, 
and underlying strategies or models.
Execution Example 2 [Example 2: RA Domain] Consider 
again the robot in the RA domain that has just collected a 
book from the study and delivered it to the engineer in the 
office, as in Example 1 above.
• During planning or plan execution, the robot can explain 
the need for particular actions, and explain their direct 
and indirect effects.
  Human: “Why did you move to cell c4 of the study?”
  Robot: “I had to retrieve the large robotics book from 
the table. The table is in cell c4 of the study.”
• Human: “Relationally describe the effects of moving to 
cell c4 of the study.”
  Robot: loc∗(rob1, cell4), loc(rob1, study).
• Human: “Why do you believe the heavy encyclopedia is 
in the study?”
  Robot: “At time 0, I assumed encyclopedia was in the 
library. At time 4, I observed encyclopedia was in the 
study. To restore consistency, I inferred encyclopedia was 
in the study from time 0.”
Without the second guiding principle, the robot may be 
incapable of providing suitable explanations for questions 
about decisions (“why do you want to pick up [...]?”, “why 
did you move to [...]?”), beliefs (“why do you believe [...]?”), 
and related events (“what happened [...]?”, “when was book2 
moved to [...]?”). Recent work explains goal changes based 
on beliefs while planning with incomplete information [9], 
but this work only presents desiderata without a formal 
framework to achieve them. Other work proposes a formal 
theory and uses a belief-desire-intention model to gener-
ate reasons that include facts, goals, action outcomes, and 
failed actions, but the explanations are based on fixed struc-
tures and complexity, and their implementation is opaque 
to natural language [37]. Also, the desired online response 
in dynamic domains, which is part of this claim, is achieved 
using the underlying refinement-based framework—see 
Sect. 5.2.
퐏퐫퐢퐧퐜퐢퐩퐥퐞 #ퟑ ∶ Explanation generation systems should 
have as few task-/domain-specific components as possible.
Execution Example 3 [Example 3: RB domain] Consider a 
robot that has just completed baking Afghan biscuits and is 
interacting with a human in the RB domain.
• Given the clear separation of concerns between the 
domain-specific and domain-independent content, our 
architecture can be adapted to the RB domain, although 
the agent, its task, associated concepts, and the other ele-
ments of the signature differ from the RA domain.
  Human: “Please describe the plan you executed.”
  Robot: “ [...] I poured the cocoa in the yellow small 
ingredient bowl to a red large mixing bowl. I poured 
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the cornflakes in a red medium ingredient bowl to the 
red large mixing bowl. I mixed the contents of the red 
large mixing bowl. I scraped the mixture to a metallic 
silver medium baking tray. I picked up the metallic silver 
medium baking tray. I moved to table2 with the metallic 
silver medium baking tray in my hand. I opened the silver 
toaster oven on table2 . I put the metallic silver medium 
baking tray in the silver toaster oven. I closed the silver 
toaster oven. I baked the silver metallic medium baking 
tray in the silver toaster oven for 20 minutes. I opened the 
silver toaster oven. I picked up the metallic silver medium 
baking tray from the silver toaster oven. I put the metallic 
silver medium baking tray on table2 . [...] I achieved my 
goal.”
The third guiding principle is supported by our archi-
tecture’s representational choices, with the content being 
domain-independent except when the agent interacts with 
the world (i.e., for sensing or actuation). In the absence 
of this principle, correct explanations may still be gener-
ated for different domains, but a greater effort (human and 
computational) and architectural changes may be required 
to represent and reason in different domains. For example, 
the framework reported by [28] is designed for the specific 
task of robot navigation; narrating an agent’s behavior in a 
new domain will require changes to the architecture. Wicak-
sono et al. [36] also consider fixed questions and answers 
for a tool use domain. Roberts et al. [27] present a theory of 
plan explanation that is not domain specific, but they make 
a representational commitment to hierarchical structures and 
do not instantiate their theory. This claim also ensures that 
different explanations are provided in different domains for 
principled reasons and not simply because of the differences 
between the domains. For example, with our architecture, 
the difference in quantization between RA and RA∗ requires 
no additional programming for the explanation module. 
Despite a marked increase in the number of steps in the 
plans for these two domains, there is a significant change 
in the size of explanations only when asked to explain in a 
very fine resolution.
퐏퐫퐢퐧퐜퐢퐩퐥퐞 #ퟒ ∶ Explanation generation systems should 
consider human understanding and feedback to inform their 
choices while constructing explanations.
Execution Example 4 [Example 4: RB Domain] Continue 
with the previous example in the RB domain.
• When asked to provide more concise and relevant infor-
mation, the robot moves its operating point along the 
specificity and verbosity axes.
  Human: “Provide a concise and relevant description.”
  Robot: “[...] I poured the cocoa in bowl5 to 
mixing_bowl1 . I poured the cornflakes in bowl2 to 
mixing_bowl1 . I mixed the contents of mixing_bowl1 . 
I scraped the mixture in mixing_bowl1 to baking_tray1 . 
I picked up baking_tray1 . I moved to table2 .  I 
opened toaster_oven1 on table2 . I put baking_tray1 in 
toaster_oven1 . I baked baking_tray1 in toaster_oven1 
for 20 minutes. I opened toaster_oven1 . I picked up 
baking_tray1 . I then put baking_tray1 on table2 . [...] I 
achieved my goal.”
• Human: “Please be more concise.”
  Robot: “I preheated toaster_oven1 . I mixed flour, 
butter, sugar, cocoa, and cornflakes in mixing_bowl1 . 
I scraped the mixture to baking_tray1 . I baked 
baking_tray1 in toaster_oven1 for 20 minutes. I put 
baking_tray1 on table2 . I achieved my goal.”
• The robot explains the need for, and can potentially 
explain the likelihood of, particular actions and out-
comes during planning or execution.
  Human: “Why did you move the baking tray to 
table2 ?” Robot: “I needed to put the baking tray in the 
toaster oven that is on table2 .” Human: “How likely is 
it that there is cocoa in the yellow ingredient bowl?”
  Robot: “I am 95% sure there is no cocoa in the yel-
low ingredient bowl”.
Systems that do not implement this claim may provide 
explanations that do not match the need of the human user. 
Without at least an implied theory of mind, the robot can 
assume that others have made the same inferences given 
the same knowledge and observations. If human feedback 
is ignored, it would also become permissible to repeat the 
same explanation (and not state things more succinctly) 
when asked to “please be more concise”. Much recent 
work in explainable AI has considered the task of discern-
ing the mental model(s) a human is operating on [9, 31].
퐏퐫퐢퐧퐜퐢퐩퐥퐞 #ퟓ ∶ Explanation generation systems should 
use knowledge elements that support non-monotonic revi-
sion based on immediate or delayed observations obtained 
from active exploration or reactive action execution.
Execution Example 5 [Example 5: RB Domain] Consider the 
following exchange in the RB domain about learned actions 
and axioms.
• The robot can describe the learned knowledge.
  Human: “What have you learned?”
  Robot: “I have learned to chop an ingredient. I have 
learned to spill an ingredient from a bowl.”
• Learned knowledge can be revised over time.
  Human: “What have you learned about action 
chop?”
  Robot: “It is necessary to hold a knife to perform chop. 
It is necessary for the ingredient to be located in front. 
The action sometimes fails if the ingredient is not butter.”
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• Knowledge can be acquired from observations obtained 
from active exploration (e.g., during downtime), reac-
tive action execution (e.g., unexpected and unexplained 
observation), or by observing other robots.
  Human: “How did you learn that a baking tray can 
contain ingredients?”
  Robot: “I poured cocoa on a baking tray. I observed 
baking tray contained cocoa.
  or, in a different context:
  Robot: “I poured cocoa into a bowl that was on a bak-
ing tray. The observed the bowl did not contain cocoa. I 
observed the baking tray contained cocoa.”
• Robot can learn from delayed action outcomes. For 
example, when a dish set in an oven to be cooked is 
observed to be burned, the robot infers the reason to be 
setting the wrong temperature initially.
Our architecture learns new elements to the signature and 
the axioms—see Sect. 4.5 and Sridharan and Meadows [32]. 
Including the new knowledge during reasoning improves the 
robot’s ability to explain past failure and its own capabilities. 
If an architecture does not support this guiding principle, 
the robot’s explanatory power is limited to its initial knowl-
edge. Much of the recent work in explainable AI focuses 
on plan explanation and does not support non-monotonic 
knowledge revision. One counterexample is Wicaksono et al. 
[36], which does involve learning action models by select-
ing and actively exploring an action of interest. However, 
the approach does not interactively adapt explanations to 
user needs.
5.2  Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated the hypothesis that the ability to construct 
explanatory descriptions scales to complex, dynamic 
domains. To do so, we measured the reliability and compu-
tational cost of generating explanations as a function of the 
complexity of the domain and the explanations. The meas-
ured computational time did not include planning time or 
execution time because they are relatively larger and the 
scalability of planning and execution with a refinement-
based architecture has been explored elsewhere [34].
We conducted 10,000 simulated trials in the RA domain 
and RA∗ domain for three points of increasing complexity 
in the space of explanations: (i) “Low” (highest abstrac-
tion, lowest specificity, lowest verbosity); (ii) “Medium” 
(medium abstraction, specificity and verbosity); and (iii) 
“High” (lowest abstraction, highest specificity, highest ver-
bosity). In each trial, we varied the initial state, goal state, 
and questions posed to the robot. We also (separately) com-
puted the desired explanations by reasoning with complete 
knowledge and used these as ground truth (unknown to the 
robot). The trials were run on a laptop with a 2.40 GHz 
Intel i7 CPU. Recall that the RA∗ domain has 25 times as 
many grid cells in each room as the RA domain, resulting in 
many more actions, longer plans (e.g., with ≈ 40 steps), and 
longer explanations. In both domains, a reasonably accurate 
explanation was obtained in each trial—an explanation is 
considered to be reasonable if it includes most of the objects 
and attributes in the ground truth explanation.
Table 1 shows the average results for each quantization 
and each point in the space of explanations. We observe 
an increase in the time taken to compute explanations with 
an increase in the level of quantization. This increase is 
more pronounced as the complexity of the explanations 
increases, e.g., the increase in computation time from RA to 
RA∗ is more in the “High” column than with “Medium” or 
“Low”. However, the time taken to compute explanations 
is not significant in most experimental trials, especially 
when compared with the planning (or execution) time. Even 
when asked to provide detailed descriptions in a domain 
with higher quantization (combination of RA∗ and “High” in 
Table 1), the robot is able to do so in a reasonable amount of 
time. Also, it is uncommon to be asked to provide a detailed 
explanation under a high level of quantization. These results 
support our hypothesis and indicate the applicability of our 
architecture to generate explanations in complex, dynamic 
domains. In other work, we have shown that the underly-
ing architecture for planning with incomplete commonsense 
knowledge scales to more complex domains. These results 
thus also indicate the feasibility of introducing more com-
plex models of cognition and learning to generate richer 
explanations.
6  Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we have formalized the process of providing 
explanatory descriptions of decisions, beliefs, and expe-
riences in human-robot collaboration. Specifically, we 
described a theory of explanations comprising (i) claims 
about representing, reasoning with, and learning knowl-
edge to support explanatory descriptions; (ii) three axes 
to characterize these descriptions; and (iii) a methodology 
for constructing these descriptions. We also described an 
implementation of this theory that is fully integrated with, 
and strongly influenced by, the representation, reasoning, 
and learning capabilities of the underlying refinement-based 
Table 1  Computation time for domains of different quantization for 
different points in the space of explanations
Domain Low Medium High
RA 0.00014 0.00025 0.0027
RA
∗ 0.00041 0.0154 0.232
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architecture. This architecture uses tightly-coupled transition 
diagrams at different resolutions to support non-monotonic 
logical reasoning and probabilistic reasoning with com-
monsense knowledge and sensor inputs. We also described 
execution traces and results demonstrating the impacts 
of our theory on the scalable construction of explanatory 
descriptions.
Our work opens up multiple directions for further 
research. First, in this paper, representation and reasoning 
was limited to two resolutions for ease of explanation. How-
ever, other experiments (not reported here) indicate that con-
cepts such as refinement and relevance apply to additional 
resolutions. Future work will explore the automatic transfer 
of information and control between multiple resolutions, 
constructing explanations on demand at the desired level of 
abstraction. Second, our current architecture does not pro-
vide partial explanations, i.e., explanations of some subset 
of the observations. Future work will explore providing such 
partial explanations by limiting reasoning to, and choosing 
the operating point along the three axes, based on the obser-
vations of interest. Third, we will use the insights gained 
from the experiments reported in this paper to conduct 
studies with human subjects. These studies will evaluate 
the effectiveness and usability of our theory of explanations 
and its implementation; the corresponding results will help 
revise the claims, methodology, and the architecture. Finally, 
the results reported in this paper were only based on experi-
ments in simulation, although the planning and diagnostics 
capabilities of the refinement-based architecture have been 
evaluated on physical robots. In the future, we will evaluate 
the ability to provide explanatory descriptions on one or 
more robots sensing and interacting with their surroundings 
and collaborating with humans in complex domains.
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